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Summary: This contribution analyzes whether remigration intentions and actual remigration to their homeland on the
part of Turkish migrants to Germany have evolved over time, and if so, why. To do so, event-history analysis is applied
to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Findings reveal an increase in remigration intentions as well
as rates of return for first generation migrants after the turn of the millennium. Before that, both such intentions and
rates of actual return had declined, mostly as a consequence of integration in Germany. Those migrants who plan to
return have a stronger emotional attachment to Turkey than those who plan to stay. However, the two groups differ nei-
ther with respect to their educational levels nor in terms of their perceptions of discrimination. There are similar find-
ings with respect to the small though slightly increasing group of immigrants who actually returned to Turkey. It is thus
argued that rising remigration intentions and actual remigration among first-generation migrants are unrelated to their
integration into German society and are probably triggered by social change in their country of origin.
Keywords: Immigration; Remigration; Remigration Intentions; Integration; Discrimination; Event-History Analysis;
GSOEP.
Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag der Frage nach, wie sich die Remigrationsabsichten und das Remigrationsverhalten tür-
kischstämmiger Einwanderer in Deutschland im Zeitverlauf verändert haben, und wertet dazu alle Erhebungswellen des
sozio-çkonomischen Panels (SOEP) ereignisdatenanalytisch aus. Die Befunde zeigen, dass Remigrationsabsichten und
-raten türkischstämmiger Einwanderer seit der Jahrtausendwende angestiegen sind, nachdem sie zuvor vor allem in
Folge zunehmender Integration abgenommen hatten. Diejenigen Einwanderer, die ihre Remigration planen, haben eine
stärkere emotionale Bindung an die Türkei als diejenigen, die dauerhaft in Deutschland bleiben wollen. Beide Gruppen
unterscheiden sich weder im Hinblick auf ihr Bildungsniveau noch im Ausmaß ihrer Wahrnehmungen von Diskriminie-
rung in Deutschland. Ähnliches gilt für die kleine, aber leicht wachsende Gruppe tatsächlicher Remigranten. Daraus
wird geschlossen, dass die Remigrationsabsichten und -raten der Einwanderer der ersten Generation unabhängig von In-
tegrationsprozessen angestiegen und vermutlich eher dem sozialen Wandel in der Türkei geschuldet sind.
Schlagworte: Einwanderung; Rückwanderung; Rückwanderungsabsichten; Integration; Diskriminierung; Ereignisdaten-
analyse; SOEP.
1 Introduction
In Germany, numerous media reports and first em-
pirical studies have recently been published focus-
ing on allegedly increasing emigration rates of
Turks to Turkey (Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012;
Aydin 2010). This literature conveys a strong im-
pression that young and skilled Turks are the ones
prone to turn their backs on Germany and remi-
grate to a prosperous homeland. This coincides
with an increasing awareness that Germany needs
well-educated immigrants to alleviate the conse-
quences of population ageing and a shortage of
skilled personnel. The factors triggering rising emi-
gration rates are thought to be economic oppor-
tunities in a growing Turkey in combination with
discrimination-related lack of opportunity in Ger-
many (Aydin 2010).
Official data does not shed much light on the scope
and causes of this phenomenon. Firstly, the data are
not reliable since many remigrants do not un-regis-
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ter in Germany. Secondly, it does not contain any
information on skill level or emigration motives.
And finally, it does not differentiate between, for
example, a naturalized Turkish labor migrant re-
turning to Anatolia and a German businesswoman
moving to Istanbul. This lack of information on the
scale and causes of recent patterns of remigration
to Turkey is unfortunate from both a theoretical
and a policy-oriented perspective.
Theoretically, the motivation of migrants to invest
in host-country specific resources partly depends on
their expected length of stay abroad. Accumulating
these resources takes time and effort and is only
worthwhile if they are expected to yield returns in
the long run. Accordingly, remigration and emigra-
tion intentions have an impact on motivation to
learn a host country’s language, find a well-paying
job, and invest in the success of one’s children in
school (Dustmann 1999, 2000). Furthermore, if
Turks living in Germany showed a rising tendency
to remigrate after years of life in Germany, this
would pose a puzzle. Many empirical studies have
suggested that due to a steady increase in social and
economic ties in the host country, migrants become
more prone to settle down over time (e. g., Massey
1986).
From a policy perspective, high remigration rates
among the young and skilled may weaken a coun-
try’s chances to succeed in the often-cited interna-
tional “race for talent” (Shachar 2006). This race
centers on attracting skilled migrants and inducing
them to stay, in other words, to not simply move to
where their human capital yields the highest returns
(Massey & Akresh 2006). Migrants or individuals
with roots abroad are more likely to make such a
move and remigrate. On the one hand, they have
access to migration networks that lower the costs
and increase the benefits of moving (Massey & Es-
paÇa 1987). On the other hand, many also possess
resources that can be easily transferred to the coun-
try of origin – and “tastes” that render living there
more attractive (Gundel & Peters 2008: 770). It
would represent a problem if this tendency was re-
inforced by better-educated migrants and their de-
scendants having a sense that discrimination is im-
peding access to economic resources and social
status.
Against this backdrop, our paper has a twofold
purpose. Firstly, we wish to examine the question
of whether emigration intentions and emigration
rates have in fact increased among the population
of Turkish origin living in Germany. To the extent
this is indeed the case, we will, secondly, explain
these changes. In this respect, we will focus on iden-
tifying those socio-demographic subgroups that
trigger such an increase and on determining whether
long-term changes in remigration rates and inten-
tions can be accounted for by the explanatory fac-
tors usually discussed in studies on (re-)migration,
i. e., migrants’ social, economic, and emotional ties
to the receiving and sending countries.
2 Theoretical background and existing
findings
With respect to theory, remigration is simply an-
other form of migration. As such, it is influenced by
characteristics of individual migrants as well as by
structural factors in the sending and receiving con-
text. In the following, we will briefly review the
most important theoretical arguments on remigra-
tion and present the relevant empirical findings on
the according mechanisms.
2.1 Neoclassical economics and new economics of
labor migration
Within individual-level approaches to migration
such as neoclassical economics (NE) and new eco-
nomics of labor migration (NELM), migrants’ re-
migration behavior is influenced by their resources
in both the receiving country and the country of
origin and by the returns these resources are ex-
pected to yield in both contexts.1 From a neoclassi-
cal perspective, remigration mostly occurs when
immigrants either fail to find or lose a (good) job in
the host country, so that the economic returns to
migration are lower than expected. Meanwhile, the
proponents of NELM have argued that migrants
are target earners who are eager to return to the
families they have left behind once they have accu-
mulated enough money to compensate for certain
market failures at home (Stark 1991). In a similar
vein, Borjas’ seminal paper emphasizes that remi-
gration can reflect “mistakes in the initial migration
decision” but that it is also possible that remigra-
tion allows “some workers to attain higher utility
or wealth than if the migration decision was perma-
nent” (Borjas 1994: 1691).
Empirical studies of remigration that start out from
these approaches thus accentuate migrants’ human
capital endowments and their economic and social
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1 The following discussion is partly based on Cassarino’s
account of theoretical approaches to remigration; see Cas-
sarino 2004; Massey et al. 1998.
ties in the sending and receiving contexts.2 The neo-
classic assumption that remigration occurs when
initial migration has turned out to be a failure has
been confirmed in several studies: being jobless or
working part-time increases the likelihood of return
(Constant & Massey 2002; Kuhlenkasper & Stein-
hardt 2012; Gundel & Peters 2008). Inversely, a
high income seems to be negatively correlated with
return migration and intentions (Kuhlenkasper &
Steinhardt 2012; Constant & Massey 2002; Con-
stant & Zimmermann 2012).
Findings are mixed with respect to migrants’ edu-
cation. According to the mechanism proposed by
Borjas & Bratsberg (1996), migrants with higher
educational levels who belong to low-skilled immi-
grant groups are more prone to remigrate, thereby
increasing the group’s original selectivity. Several
studies support this argument (for Spain and Italy
see De Haas & Fokkema 2011; for Germany Kuh-
lenkasper & Steinhardt 2012;3 for home-country
schooling of Turks in Germany Constant & Massey
2002). However, the effect on remigration inten-
tions seems to be less clear (Steiner & Velling
1994).
With respect to migrants’ social ties, empirical evi-
dence clearly shows that having children or a part-
ner in the receiving country reduces both the chan-
ces of remigration and the intention to remigrate,
especially when the partner is naturalized (Dust-
mann 1996) and children are in school. In turn,
having a partner back home renders return migra-
tion more likely (Constant & Massey 2002; Kuh-
lenkasper & Steinhardt 2012; Gundel & Peters
2008; Constant & Zimmermann 2012).
The two theoretical approaches come to different
conclusions regarding who remigrates with respect
to characteristics such as work effort (i. e., working
full- or part time), earnings and families ties in the
receiving country (Constant & Massey 2002). How-
ever, they share a focus on migrants’ individual
characteristics and resources and they lead to simi-
lar conclusions about long-term changes in remi-
gration. Educational credentials, occupational sta-
tus, skills in the host country’s language, and
contacts with non-migrant citizens evolve over time
and can thus be expected to increase over time. In
turn, resources in and ties to the sending country
have mostly built up back home and can thus be ex-
pected to gradually wither. After all, the composi-
tion of ties and resources reflect migrants’ invest-
ment decisions and resources that are acquired in
the receiving country usually yield higher returns
there than those acquired back home. Accordingly,
within both theoretical approaches remigration
rates and intentions should gradually decrease with
increasing duration of stay.
Transnational accounts of migration and remigra-
tion call into question the universality of such a
smooth settlement process and thus take a different
point of view on migrants’ remigration patterns.
2.2 Transnational approaches to remigration
Within transnational approaches, remigration is
linked to and part of a broader pattern of transna-
tional activities. Migrants are considered to belong
to and participate in border-spanning social net-
works and activities that link sending and receiving
countries through regular visits, trade and remittan-
ces, and association-based political and cultural ac-
tivities (see Glick-Schiller 1999). As a result, mi-
grants maintain economic and social ties to their
various countries of origin even if they gradually in-
tegrate into the host country. Once economic or
political conditions in the receiving or sending con-
text change, transnationally active migrants can
promptly react to these changes since they possess
skills, knowledge, and social ties valued in both
contexts. Migration and remigration are thus con-
sidered circular rather than permanent in nature
(Cassarino 2004; see also Constant & Zimmerman
2012). With respect to the explanatory factors on
the individual level, remigration is thus thought to
have as much to do with involvement in reciprocal
border-spanning networks than with narrowly de-
fined economic or family ties in either context (Cas-
sarino 2004). In fact, transnational activities such
as remittances have been shown to come along
with higher return intentions; the same applies to
investment back home (De Haas & Fokkema 2011;
see also Dustmann &Mestres 2010).
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2 If not otherwise indicated, the following studies are
based on German data. The socio-Economic Panel Study
(GSOEP, SOEP) contains information on remigration and
is thus a rather unique and often-used dataset for under-
standing this issue.
3 The authors claim that “For Turkish immigrants, outmi-
gration is characterized by a positive self-selection with re-
spect to skill intensifying the initial negative selection
process” (p. 3). However, their descriptive findings show
that those who stay in Germany have higher levels of edu-
cation than those who leave the country (Table 3 in their
paper), while their multivariate findings only partially
confirm this thesis (Table 4 in their paper): Although those
belonging to the low-status group (isco1) are less likely to
remigrate than those with medium levels (isco3), those
with high levels (isco 4) are less likely to do so.
Furthermore, identificational ties and emotional at-
tachments to the home country play an important
role in transnational approaches to remigration.
They affect the non-monetary costs of staying
abroad permanently but have received considerably
less attention than migrants’ economic and social
ties in the receiving and sending country. In the Ger-
man case, identification with Germany and speak-
ing the language have been shown to increase ex-
pected length of stay (Steiner & Velling 1994; for
remigration behavior see Constant & Massey
2002). In their study of migrants in Italy and Spain,
De Haas & Fokkema (2011) have demonstrated
that their socio-cultural integration is strongly re-
lated to a decline in return intentions.
Transnational approaches not only emphasize that
it is important to consider a broader set of factors
in explaining remigration than just economic and
family ties. With respect to long term change in re-
migration rates they also imply that these do not
necessarily decline over time, as suggested by NE
and NELM. Rather, they may remain stable due to
migrants’ ongoing transnational involvement. How-
ever, the latter’s persistence over time and genera-
tions has been questioned, both empirically and
theoretically (Waldinger 2004; for transnational
identifications see Snel et al. 2006: 303). This de-
bate notwithstanding, it seems possible that remi-
gration rates decline or remain stable – depending
on the extent of transnational activities. But it
seems in any case unlikely that remigration in-
creases after years of settlement – unless there is
major economic or societal change in the receiving
or sending context (Reagan & Olsen 2000).
In sum, the empirical studies referred to so far have
done a good job in explaining inter-individual var-
iation in remigration behavior and intentions. They
show that integration into the receiving society re-
duces the remigration probability and that ongoing
transnational activities may decelerate this process.
However, while all these studies try to explain who
migrates and who does not, they say little about
long-term changes in remigration rates. In the case
of Germany, this is partly related to the fact that
they rely on older data, whereas the currently dis-
cussed increase in remigration rates among Turks
in Germany seems to be a rather recent phenom-
enon. More generally, the studies reviewed so far
largely ignore the potential impact of macro-level
changes in the receiving or sending country. These
may render remigration over time more – or less –
attractive independent of changes in migrants’ indi-
vidual resources, ties, and identifications.
2.3 Structural approaches to remigration
Structural approaches to remigration focus on its
broader economic and social context: “As the
structural approach to return migration contends,
return is not only a personal issue, but above all a
social and contextual one, affected by situational
and structural factors.” (Cassarino 2004: 257)
Many of the sending countries for Western Eu-
rope’s labor migrants have experienced periods of
economic prosperity and have themselves become –
at least temporarily – attractive destinations for im-
migrants. But even without dramatic change
abroad, migrants may become more prone to remi-
grate if returns to skill and education decrease in
the receiving country, for example due to deterio-
rating economic conditions or rising levels of xeno-
phobia. Studies that analyze the impact of struc-
tural change on remigration rates are rare. An
exception is the analysis by Kuhlenkasper & Stein-
hardt (2012) on remigration patterns of migrants
to Germany. The authors find a “rising effect” after
the year 2000 “[that] is likely to be driven by the
positive development of the Turkish economy”
(2012: 21) but they do not pursue this argument
any further. Kirdar shows that return migration
from Germany reflects variation in purchasing
power parity and that an increase in the latter
leads to higher rates of remigration among middle-
aged migrants (Kirdar 2009). A study by Massey
et al. (2008) focuses on immigration from Poland
to Germany but is nevertheless interesting against
the backdrop of our research question. The au-
thors show that macro-level changes need to be
substantive or even “shock-like” in order to affect
human behavior normally characterized by inertia
and bounded rationality (Massey et al. 2008:
139).
These different theoretical approaches and empiri-
cal studies reveal that a variety of explanatory vari-
ables and analytical levels need to be considered in
a thorough analysis of remigration behavior. Propo-
nents of neoclassical approaches and the new eco-
nomics of labor migration focus on migrants’ indi-
vidual economic and social ties in the receiving and
sending countries. Transnational approaches em-
phasize that through their involvement in transna-
tional activities and networks, migrants often main-
tain homeland-related identities, business ties, and
reciprocal social relationships. These are less nar-
rowly defined than the individual resources and ties
that are the focus of economic approaches. And
structural approaches remind us that we need to
take a closer look at macro-level changes in the
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sending and receiving countries that may trigger
long-term changes in remigration rates.
A further insight from migration theory that needs
to be taken into account when analyzing long-term
changes in remigration is the differentiation between
remigration intentions and actual moves. Going
back to Speare, migration theorists have argued
that a move becomes only likely for those persons
that have ever thought about moving, and that
these stages of the migration process follow a dif-
ferent logic (Kalter 2000: 462ff.). In particular,
perceived opportunity differentials between the
country of origin and the receiving country should
influence the emergence of a desire to move whereas
the actual move is rather shaped by constraints,
facilitators and resources. At this stage, perceptions
of opportunity differentials only play a role by in-
fluencing migration intentions that usually precede
actual moves (Kley 2011: 474).
Before we will turn to a description and explana-
tion of recent changes in intended and actual remi-
gration among Turkish migrants to Germany we
will offer some background information on the
groups and contexts under consideration here.
Based on this, we will specify our expected results.
3 Remigration intentions and behavior
among Turks in Germany: expected
results
Many of the 2.5 million Turks and Germans with
Turkish roots living in Germany today were re-
cruited as so called “guest workers” in the 1960s
and early 1970s (BMI/BAMF 2009: 220). Immigra-
tion rates (for non-German immigrants from Tur-
key) nevertheless peaked after the end of recruit-
ment in 1973 due to family reunification and
marriage migration. They remained at high levels
(100,000–200,000 individuals per year) until the
mid-1980 and declined afterwards. Since 2007,
they have dropped below 30,000 individuals per
year (data provided by the German Federal Statisti-
cal Office). Today, 40 percent of the Turkish-origin
population living in Germany was born in the
country and the average length of stay is about 26
years (BMI/BAMF 2009: 224).4
3.1 Turkish migrants’ in Germany: integration
process and transnational activities
With respect to their integration into German soci-
ety, the Turkish-origin population still bears marks
of the “guest worker” era. On average, Turks have
limited language skills, lower educational creden-
tials, higher rates of joblessness, lower income, and
fewer social ties with Germans than other ethnic
groups (Diehl & Schnell 2006; Kalter 2011; Luthra
2012). Public attention is drawn to the alleged fail-
ure of Turkish migrants and their offspring to inte-
grate “successfully”. While their cultural back-
ground as Muslims is often held responsible for this
in the populist debate on this issue (see Sarrazin
2010), structural factors such as an ongoing ethnic
replenishment, the larger size of this group (Esser
2008), and ethnic discrimination dominate aca-
demic discourse.
Despite the fact that the integration of Turkish mi-
grants – and of their children – lags behind that of
other groups, there is no evidence that it does not
progress over time and generations. Mostly due to
rising levels of education, joblessness is lower
among second than among first generation mi-
grants (Herwig & Konietzka 2012), and the former
are more likely to work as white collar employees
than members of their parents’ generation (Granato
& Kalter 2001). They also have more contacts with
Germans, higher rates of intermarriage (Nauck
2001; Schroedter & Kalter 2010), better language
skills; and they identify with Germany more
strongly (Diehl & Schnell 2006). Similarly, their
ties to Turkey have weakened rather than strength-
ened because many know this country only from
visits abroad. For example, the share of individuals
remitting money declines with migrants’ increasing
duration of stay in Germany and rising levels of in-
tegration (Holst & Schrooten 2006).
Based on this brief summary of Turkish migrants’
integration processes it seems unlikely that long
term changes in remigration rates reflect a stagna-
tion or even reversal of their adaptation in Ger-
many, or a sudden increase in their involvement in
transnational activities. It might thus be worth-
while to take a closer look at macro-structural
changes in Turkey and Germany that could inde-
pendently affect remigration rates – especially
when they come shock-like – according to struc-
tural approaches to remigration.
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tomatically citizens. They become German by birth only if
their parents fulfill certain requirements such as legal stay
in the country for 8 years. Even these children must decide
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or German citizens since double citizenship is not recog-
nized.
With respect to the situation in Turkey it is hardly
possible to speak of any structural “shocks” but
there has been significant economic and cultural
change in the country (Gerhards & Hans 2011).
Above all, GDP increased substantially since 2001.
Joblessness, however, has also increased and is cur-
rently at levels of about 10 percent. In the time
period under consideration, the share of university
graduates among the jobless population rose
(World Bank 2014, see Figure 1). Cultural change
has also been substantial, with Istanbul, always a
vibrant capital at the border of Europe and Asia,
now increasingly attracting international artists,
students, and business people. At the same time, re-
ligious-conservative movements have become more
prominent under the Erdogan government, with a
growing presence of Islam in the public sphere.
Turning to the macro-structural context in Ger-
many, it seems unlikely that economic change has
triggered rising emigration rates. After all, the
European and international financial crisis has af-
fected Germany less than many other European im-
migrant destinations. However, media reports on
Turkish outmigration often claim that the situation
has become worse in terms of general acceptance in
Germany of Turkish migrants and their children.
Available data on majority members’ attitudes
shows that Germans tend to be not only more prej-
udiced and to show higher levels of social distance
toward Turkish migrants and their children as com-
pared to members of other ethnic minorities in the
country (Blohm & Wasner 2008). Turks themselves
report incidences of discrimination more often than
immigrants from other countries (Hans 2010: 286).
There is some field-experimental evidence on labor
market discrimination (Kaas & Manger 2010) even
though the lower labor-market position of Turkish
migrants is mainly a result of their comparatively
low educational credentials (Granato & Kalter
2001). But what about long-term changes in (per-
ceptions of) discrimination? In fact, the debate
about the compatibility of Islam with Western cul-
ture has gained momentum in Germany since the
turn of the last century but reliable empirical evi-
dence on this dimension of structural change is
mixed. On the one hand, perceptions of cultural
distance between Turks and Germans have in-
creased since the mid-1990s.5 On the other hand,
most indicators have shown the level of Islamopho-
bia in the country to be stable – at a relatively high
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Source:World Bank (2014)
Fig. 1 Macro-structural change in Turkey: economic indicators
5 Most importantly, German perception of cultural dis-
tance between Germans and Turks have increased sub-
stantially between 1996 and 2006. Means on a 7-point
scale (1 = low and 7 = high distance) have increased from
4.09 (males) and 4.15 (females) in 1996 to 5.14 (males)
and 5.24 (females) in 2006. In the same time span, the
German perception of distance with Italians and ethnic
Germans has remained stable or even declined (own anal-
ysis based on data from the ALLBUS, available under
http://www.gesis.org/allbus).
level (Kühnel & Leibold 2007). According to data
from the German socio-economic Panel (SOEP),
perceptions of discrimination are lower among
second than among first generation migrants but
have overall remained stable over time – again at
comparatively high levels.6
While these changes can hardly be described as
“shock-like” there is a possibility that today, partic-
ularly educated Turks or Germans with Turkish
roots feel increasingly bothered by a continuing
lack of social acceptance in Germany. For some mi-
grants, the gap between expectations and reality
may thus have widened during the last decade, even
if the situation as a whole has not changed dramati-
cally for the worse (for this “integration paradox”,
see Kessler et al. 1999; ten Teije et al. 2013). Apart
from the possibility that skilled Turks in particular
suffer increasingly from a lack of social acceptance
and opportunities, there is no evidence that there
are any disruptions in the integration process of
Turkish migrants and their children that may have
rendered remigration more attractive.
3.2 Remigration of Turkish migrants in Germany:
expected results
We will now turn to our own analysis of the long-
term dynamics of remigration behavior and inten-
tions of Turks in Germany. Empirical studies of this
aspect of remigration behavior and intentions are
so far almost nonexistent. We will start out by de-
scribing changes in remigration rates and intentions
and by examining the question of whether poten-
tially rising remigration rates and intentions are
caused by individual-level changes in the character-
istics and resources that have been shown to affect
past remigration, most importantly migrants’ eco-
nomic and social ties to both their home their and
host countries. According to NE and NELM, these
characteristics influence migrants’ desire to stay
abroad or to return to their – or their parents’ –
country of origin. The more human and social capi-
tal from one context they possess, the more likely it
is that they move to or stay in the context where
these resources yield high returns, or that they plan
to do so. We will also take a closer look at the vari-
ables that are in the focus of transnational ap-
proaches on remigration, namely border-crossing
activities and homeland related identities. Since we
have shown that these ties and resources reflect
Turkish migrants’ ongoing integration process in
Germany and since neither empirical evidence nor
theoretical reasoning suggests that transnational ac-
tivities have increased over time we assume that a
potential increase in Turkish migrants’ remigration
rates and intentions does neither reflect a disrup-
tion in their integration process (i. e. their ties to
and economic and social resources) in Germany
nor an increase in their transnational ties and activ-
ities.
Structural approaches to remigration are difficult
to test with individual-level data. However, we
want to give it a try by analyzing whether rising lev-
els of estrangement from Germany and increasing
perceptions of discrimination have triggered rising
remigration rates and intentions. On the one hand,
we have shown above that it seems unlikely that
these have increased strongly and suddenly enough
to overcome inertia that characterizes migration be-
havior. On the other hand, it seems nevertheless
possible that stable or slightly increasing percep-
tions of discrimination and estrangement from Ger-
many among the Turkish origin population in Ger-
many have rendered remigration more attractive.
These attitudinal and emotional variables may,
however, have a different impact on emigration in-
tentions and behavior. Dissatisfaction with the sit-
uation in Germany can be expected to have an im-
pact on emigration intentions – and being asked
about such intentions may even offer an opportu-
nity to express respective dissatisfaction in a survey
– but may not have any behavioral implications.
Emigrating is a big step that raises substantial costs
and that is probably less influenced by attitudinal
variables. As Senyürekli & Menjvar (2012: 15) put
it: “Decisions to return (or stay) are more often
shaped by the social context and structural factors
than by an individual will or motivation.” The lat-
ter should thus influence migration decisions only
indirectly by affecting remigration intentions pre-
ceding actual moves (Kley 2011). We thus expect,
secondly, that a potential increase in Turkish mi-
grants’ remigration intentions has been triggered by
increasingly negative attitudes and feelings about
Germany but that the latter have not affected mi-
grants’ remigration behavior.
Our analysis will enable us to at least indirectly as-
sess the role of macro-structural changes in Turkey:
We take into account different individual-level vari-
ables from a broad spectrum of theoretical ap-
proaches to remigration, notably NE, NELM, and
transnational approaches. Furthermore, we capture
macro-structural change in Germany, i. e., “histori-
cally” changing perceptions of discrimination and
exclusion, by controlling migrants’ attitudes and
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from the authors upon request.
feelings about Germany such as their perceptions of
discrimination and their estrangement with their
host country. We thus assume, without being able
to test this argument directly with the data at hand,
that potentially remaining changes in Turkish’ mi-
grants’ remigration intentions and behavior (after
controlling for change in their ties to and resources
in both contexts, in transnational activities, and in
perceptions of discrimination and exclusion in Ger-
many) reflect macro-structural change in Turkey.
The latter may lead to the perception that returns
to human and social and cultural capital (e. g., lan-
guage skills) are higher in the country of origin
than in the country of destination and that this is
the best moment to return.
4 Data and methods
In our analysis, we use data from the German So-
cio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which offers
information on private households in Germany
(www.diw.de/de/soep). This dataset has been used
in numerous studies of inter-individual variation in
remigration intentions and behavior for a number
of reasons. First of all, in this data set labor mi-
grants from Turkey were oversampled when the
original sample was taken in 1984 so that case
numbers are large enough. Second, SOEP data pro-
vides longitudinal information on a broad range of
topics since the same households stay in the panel
as long as possible – including individuals who join
these households as, for example, children, part-
ners, and immigrants (Wagner et al. 2007). Third
and finally, the data set contains information on
panel dropouts so that remigrants can be identified
and remigration can be analyzed prospectively
(Neiss & Kroh 2012).
Persons who were no longer interviewed in the
SOEP because they left Germany are coded as “re-
migrants” in the lifespell data set. This dataset con-
tains all available information about the where-
abouts of respondents who no longer participate in
the survey. For some cases, the information that a
former respondent who could not be found at his/
her last address has emigrated has been collected by
interviewers, mostly by talking to other household
members or neighbors. For other cases, drop-out
studies provide this sort of information. These stud-
ies draw on official register data which contain the
information that someone has moved abroad as
long as the person has deregistered. The number of
former respondents coded as “remigrants” prob-
ably includes a few persons who moved to a coun-
try other than their country of origin. Strictly
speaking, we do not know to which country a per-
son coded as an “emigrant” has moved. However,
official migration statistics show that the vast ma-
jority of Turkish emigrants from Germany moves
(back) to Turkey.7 Similarly, some respondents
who may have moved back might not have been
coded correctly as remigrants (Constant & Mas-
sey 2002).
Respondents have also been asked – in each SOEP
wave from 1984 to 2011 – whether they plan to
stay in Germany forever or to take up residence for
a certain amount of time only. Individuals who re-
plied in the negative to the question of whether
they wished to stay in Germany forever are coded
as individuals with an intention to remigrate.8
While most studies presented above use older SOEP
waves, we will include all available survey waves in
our analysis (1984–2011). In order to rule out that
compositional changes caused by refreshment sam-
ples are responsible for the observed changes in re-
migration intentions and rates we control for re-
spondents’ duration of stay in Germany (for first
generation migrants). We also conduct a robustness
check by running a model restricted to those re-
spondents who have participated since 1984. Given
the debate on Turkish remigration, we restrict our
study to first and second generation migrants (re-
spectively, to those who immigrated at the age of 6
or older, and those who immigrated before the age
of 6 or were born in Germany but have at least one
foreign born parent) from Turkey. We do not differ-
entiate between Germans and Turks in our analysis
because holding German citizenship has either no
or a negative effect (as an indicator of integration)
on remigration intentions or behavior
From a theoretical viewpoint, we wish to deter-
mine, first, whether and, if so, why a rising number
of individuals have decided, over time, not to stay
in Germany forever (“remigration intention”) or
has left the country (“remigration behavior”). We
use event-history analysis in order to look closely at
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7 In 2012, 27,725 Turks moved from Germany to a for-
eign country. 26,996 of these Turks moved to Turkey. De-
spite a certain fuzziness we can thus safely assume that on-
ly very few Turks move from Germany to another country
(Data provided by the German Federal Statistic Office
upon request).
8 Until 1995, immigrants were asked How long do you
want to live in Germany? Those who answered I want to
return within the next 12 months/to stay several more
years in Germany were coded as having a remigration in-
tention. From 1996 on, the question was: Do you want to
stay in Germany forever? Yes/No.
the effect of the year of observation. Because inten-
tions and behavior are recorded only once a year in
the SOEP although they can occur at any time be-
tween surveys, we employ discrete-time models (Al-
lison 1982: 63). We estimate the probability that an
event that has not yet occurred will happen at a cer-
tain point in time and specify how this probability
depends on the year of observation and other ex-
planatory variables (Allison 1982: 70ff.; Yamagu-
chi 1991: 17ff.). So, in terms of the chronology of
changes in independent and dependent variables,
discrete-time models enable us to draw causal con-
clusions. Each year that a person is exposed to the
risk of experiencing the event is taken as a separate
observation. In the case of remigration intentions,
the risk period begins when the person indicates for
the first time that s/he intends to stay forever in
Germany – those who never intended to stay in
Germany forever are thus excluded from the data
set (similar to never married individuals being ex-
cluded from an analysis on divorce). Over the
whole observation period, this was the case for 556
out of 2264 Turkish immigrants. The risk period
ends the year this intention is given up, in other
words when the person considers remigration for
the first time or – if the intention to stay remains
stable – with the most recent available observation.
If a person switches back and forth between an in-
tention to stay in Germany and a remigration inten-
tion, we treat each of these transitions as a separate
event. Such multi-episode data alleviate the prob-
lem of unobserved heterogeneity (Brüderl 2008)
because FE-logit models use within information
and provide unbiased estimates if unobservables
are time-constant.9 We thus estimate these models
in our robustness checks. In the case of remigra-
tion behavior, the risk period begins when a re-
spondent is included in the SOEP10 and ends when
he or she has either quit the survey panel due to
emigration, death, refusal (but still living in Ger-
many) or with the most recent available survey
year for that person.11 We thus use different sub-
samples for our analysis on remigration intentions
and behavior.
In our baseline model we include year of measure-
ment as well as socio-demographic control varia-
bles that are unrelated to the relevant theoretical
arguments, i. e., age, sex, education and family sta-
tus12. We then add indicators for the theoretically
relevant explanatory factors identified above in or-
der to see how their insertion into the model affects
the coefficient for year of measurement – the varia-
ble that captures changes in remigration over time.
Resources and ties in the sending and the receiving
context (i. e., integration in Germany) are in the fo-
cus of NE and NELM. In our analysis, they are
measured as migrants’ Turkish and German lan-
guage skills, occupational status, the presence of
family members in Turkey, and/or Germany and
children living in the household in Germany. Con-
tacts with majority members include visiting Ger-
mans and being visited by them. Transnational ac-
tivities and identificational ties with the country of
origin are measured as remittances and visits to
Turkey, as feelings of being at home during these
visits, and in terms of identification with Turkey
(“feeling Turkish”).
In order to capture the impact of structural change
in Germany in the sense of growing levels of xeno-
phobia and exclusion that may have triggered long
term increase in remigration rates or intentions, we
include respondents’ perceptions that he or she has
been discriminated against in Germany and “feels
German” (see Table A3 in the online appendix for
codings and other details).13 In all multivariate
models we control but do not display the mostly in-
significant results for time since migration (for im-
migrants). By doing this, we make sure that rising
levels of remigration (intentions) do not reflect
compositional changes in the sample in terms of mi-
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9 Using only within information shows the effect of indi-
vidual change in an independent variable over the life-
course on the dependent variable. Thereby, occurrence de-
pendence can be estimated net of self-selection (Brüderl
2008; Giesselmann &Windzio 2012).
10 The actual start of the risk period is the year of immi-
gration, which in most cases is prior to the observation
window. For these respondents we can only control for
the year since migration. Partially censored data on the
left only allows analysis conditional on the fact that the
individual has survived (i. e., not yet emigrated) before the
start of the observation (Blossfeld et al. 2007: 40).
11 See Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix (www.zfs-
online.org) for the organization of our data set.
12 Education and family status would only become theo-
retically relevant variables if we were to differentiate fur-
ther where education took place and where the partner
lives. We decided not to do this because there are very few
individuals with a partner living abroad who have ever
planned to stay in Germany forever. Furthermore, if we
differentiated between education completed abroad and
in Germany we would have had to calculate different
models for first and second generation migrants.
13 If relevant information is missing for a certain survey
year, we have replaced it with information available from
the most recent year. We use dummy variables for most
variables and control for refusals through missing dum-
mies.
grants’ duration of stay in the country that may be
systematically related to their remigration behavior
or intentions. As an additional robustness check,
we limit our analysis on remigration intentions to
the subpopulation of those Turkish migrants who
have been included in the SOEP since 1984. We
also calculate a piecewise constant model as an al-
ternative modelling strategy and a model excluding
left truncated events to make sure that we do not
underestimate the duration in risk period time,
which might have also consequences for the effect
of other independent variables. We also re-analyze
– as far as case numbers allow – respective models
by using extra-reliable information on education
over the whole observation period.
5 Findings
We will begin our empirical analysis with a descrip-
tive overview of our variables and then present the
multivariate results regarding the factors that trig-
ger long-term changes in remigration rates and in-
tentions.
5.1 Changes in remigration rates and intentions
over time – some descriptive evidence
Figure 2 displays the annual proportion of first and
second generation Turks who stated that they do
not want to stay in Germany forever (“remigration
intention”) and of those who have been coded as
“emigrants”. The figure shows that for first-genera-
tion Turks, remigration intentions decreased almost
steadily until the turn of the last century. In 2002
only about 30 percent stated that they did not plan
to stay in Germany forever. After 2002, remigration
intentions have in fact increased. However, actual
remigration has remained very low for first-genera-
tion Turks, although it also became slightly more
frequent starting in 2003. The overall pattern looks
somewhat similar for second-generation Turks, al-
beit on a lower level. Actual remigration is not dis-
played here for second-generation Turks, since the
number of remigrants is extremely small in the time
period under consideration (31 individuals). Fur-
ther analyses not presented here indicate that this
pattern is unique for Turkish labor migrants and
their children. Other migrant groups included in
the SOEP in larger numbers (e. g., Poles, Italians)
do not display this pattern but an ongoing decline
in remigration intentions. Obviously, rising remi-
gration intentions do not reflect a general increase
in international mobility.
These results demonstrate that while there is some
empirical reality behind the public debate outlined
in the introduction to our paper, two important
specifications are necessary. First, the increase we
have confirmed is much more prominent on the at-
titudinal level (that of intentions) than on the be-
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Notes: weighted results (cross weights used for remigration intentions and first wave weights used for remigration behavior). The sharp
drop in the first two SOEP years may partly reflect the return policy of the German government that gave financial bonuses to return mi-
grants and partly drop out that is usually high in the early years of a panel and that may have been readily attributed to remigration by
the interviewers.
Fig. 2 Remigration intentions and behavior of first and second generation immigrants from Turkey (means)
havioral level (that of actual remigration). Second,
it affects first generation migrants rather than their
children. With this clarification, we can now turn
to the factors that trigger rising rates of remigration
intentions (and, though less pronounced, remigra-
tion rates) after years of living in Germany.
5.2 Why have remigration intentions and rates
increased?
In order to address this question, we will formulate
separate models for the time period before and after
the increase around the turn of the last century
(i. e., until 2001 and after 2001). Prior to presenting
our multivariate analysis, we will take a brief look
at the distribution of the independent variables in
these two time periods by generation. This will ena-
ble us to assess if there has been any substantial
change with respect to factors that have been
shown to affect remigration behavior and inten-
tions in existing studies, most importantly mi-
grants’ ties and resources in Germany and Turkey,
their transnational activities, and their identifica-
tions with and attitudes about Germany.
As can be seen in Table 1 change over time and
across generations in the employment-related eco-
nomic situation of Turks in Germany mostly re-
flects the different age structures of first and second
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Table 1 Distribution of independent variables by generation and time period (meansa)
Until 2001 After 2001
First generation Second generation First generation Second generation
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 36 21 45 25
Female 47 49 47 50
Married 81 26 87 38
More than basic education 11 12 14 25
Ties and Resources in Germany and
Turkey (NE/NELM/transnationalism)
Occupational Status
retired
unemployed
working
1
5
58
0
3
52
10
9
46
0
5
51
Children in household 61 56 55 63
Family ties: most relatives in Turkey 41 10 33 4
Visits from/visiting Germans 62 78 52 66
Good German language skills 20 79 24 84
Good Turkish language skills 81 52 75 64
Remittances 16 3 9 3
Visits to Turkey 81 75 88 77
Feels at home during visits in Turkey 21 8 22 10
Identifies with Turkey 78 43 62 38
Discrimination in/estrangement from
Germany (structural change)
Has been discriminated 60 52 60 54
Identifies with Germany 4 18 15 34
Number of persons 1,553 475 655 429
Notes: significant difference between generations in bold, significant differences over time in italics (p < 0.001).
a These means are calculated in a two-step procedure: in order to avoid an overrepresentation of long-term SOEP participants, one aver-
age value for each person on the basis of person year information in the two observed time periods was generated separately: mean of
age, mode of all other independent variables. Based on this, the means of these person specific average values were generated over the
persons and compared for significant differences between the two time periods and generations.
generation migrants. The share of individuals with
more than basic education has increased over time,
especially for second generation migrants. Indica-
tors of both groups’ social ties show that the share
of Turks whose relatives are mostly living in Turkey
has declined sharply from the first to the second
generation. Surprisingly, social ties to Germans
have decreased over time despite the second genera-
tion being more integrated socially than the first.
As expected, the share of individuals who speak
German well is much higher among those who
were born in Germany than among those who im-
migrated, but there is only moderate change over
time.
Transnational activities such as remittances are
clearly limited to a minority of migrants (3 to
16%). They are higher for first than for second
generation migrants even though the two groups
converged somewhat after 2001. A large share of
migrants from both generations has traveled to Tur-
key but a comparatively small share has felt at
home right away during these visits, especially
among those who were born in Germany. Interest-
ingly, the national identification of the migrants
shows a classical pattern of assimilation: Identifica-
tion with Turkey decreases over time and identifica-
tion with Germany correspondingly increases over
time. Experiences of discrimination are similarly
high for both groups and have remained stable over
time; every second Turk has had such experiences.
Overall, there is no evidence for a disruption in the
integration process or an alienation from Germany
that may have triggered rising remigration inten-
tions or rates. The declining share of Turks who
have visited Germans in their homes and have been
visited by them is an interesting exception to this
rule.
Starting out from these distributions it seems un-
likely that rising remigration intentions reflect
weakening (strengthening) ties to and identifica-
tions with Germany (Turkey). Our multivariate
analysis will provide further insight into the rela-
tionship between immigrants’ characteristics con-
sidered so far and their remigration intentions and
behavior – and into the changes herein. We first ad-
dress socio-demographic characteristics such as
age, sex, and education in order to analyze which
subgroups have been especially likely to develop re-
migration intentions or to have emigrated over
time. In a second step, we assess the impact of mi-
grants’ social, economic, and cultural ties and re-
sources in Germany and Turkey and their transna-
tional activities. In a third step, we study the role of
respondents’ subjective perceptions of and identifi-
cation with Germany. In all models, we include the
year of observation to study change over time (see
Table 2).
Our results confirm that for first generation mi-
grants from Turkey, SOEP year has a negative effect
– i. e., remigration intentions have decreased – until
2001, even if possible socio-demographic composi-
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Table 2 Remigration intentions of first generation immigrants: discrete time models, hazard ratios
Socio-demographic
characteristics
(Basic Model)
+ Ties and Resources in
Germany and Turkey
(NE/NELM/transnationalism)
+ Discrimination in/
estrangement from
Germany (structural change)
Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001
Year of measurement 0.96***
(0.00)
1.06***
(0.01)
0.96***
(0.00)
1.07***
(0.02)
0.96***
(0.00)
1.07**
(0.02)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 1.02
(0.01)
1.04
(0.03)
0.97
(0.02)
1.03
(0.04)
0.97
(0.02)
1.03
(0.04)
Age2 0.99
(0.00)
0.99
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.99
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.99
(0.00)
Female 1.15**
(0.07)
1.12
(0.11)
1.20*
(0.11)
1.23
(0.16)
1.20*
(0.11)
1.23
(0.16)
Married 1.25*
(0.14)
0.97
(0.17)
1.10
(0.15)
0.91
(0.19)
1.08
(0.14)
0.91
(0.20)
More than basic education 0.88
(0.10)
1.24
(0.18)
0.87
(0.13)
1.24
(0.20)
0.88
(0.13)
1.21
(0.20)
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Table 2 (Continue)
Socio-demographic
characteristics
(Basic Model)
+ Ties and Resources in
Germany and Turkey
(NE/NELM/transnationalism)
+ Discrimination in/
estrangement from
Germany (structural change)
Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001
Ties and Resources in Germany and Turkey
Occupational status
(ref.: other non-working)
– retired 0.49**
(0.17)
1.42
(0.43)
0.48**
(0.17)
1.40
(0.43)
– unemployed 1.07
(0.16)
1.04
(0.22)
1.06
(0.16)
1.04
(0.22)
– working 1.00
(0.11)
1.01
(0.15)
1.01
(0.11)
1.01
(0.15)
Children in household 0.88
(0.07)
1.07
(0.15)
0.88
(0.07)
1.03
(0.15)
Family ties (ref.: all
relatives in Turkey
– most relatives in Turkey 0.96
(0.16)
0.78
(0.16)
0.98
(0.16)
0.78
(0.16)
– most relatives in Germany 0.80*
(0.08)
0.80
(0.12)
0.81*
(0.08)
0.79
(0.12)
– all relatives in Germany 0.66**
(0.07)
0.62**
(0.11)
0.67**
(0.07)
0.62**
(0.10)
Visits from/visiting Germans 0.87
(0.07)
1.02
(0.12)
0.88
(0.07)
1.02
(0.12)
Good German language skills 1.04
(0.05)
1.06
(0.09)
1.08
(0.06)
1.07
(0.09)
Good Turkish language skills 1.17**
(0.08)
1.59**
(0.22)
1.15*
(0.08)
1.61**
(0.23)
Remittances 1.80**
(0.37)
1.14
(0.44)
1.77**
(0.37)
1.07
(0.41)
Visits to Turkey 1.08
(0.16)
0.92
(0.15)
1.09
(0.16)
0.91
(0.15)
Feels at home during visits in Turkey 1.34**
(0.13)
1.64***
(0.20)
1.35**
(0.13)
1.69***
(0.22)
Identifies with Turkey 1.73***
(0.15)
1.73***
(0.23)
1.66*
(0.14)
1.69***
(0.23)
Discrimination in/estrangement from Germany
Has been discriminated 1.06
(0.08)
1.06
(0.12)
Identifies with Germany 0.61**
(0.10)
0.84
(0.16)
Number of persons’ years 5,500 2,667 4,046 2,425 4,046 2,425
Number of persons 967 537 611 483 611 483
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.09
Notes: binomial logit models were applied, controlling for time in risk period, years since migration, missing dummies, robust cluster (per-
son id) option used, collinearity was checked. Controlling for reliable educational degree over the whole observation period (bilztev == 0):
More than basic education until 2001: 0.68* (0.15), after 2001: 1.23 (0.27). If we restrict our basic models to the number of persons of
the two further models the effects of being female and married in the period until 2001 are less pronounced and lose their significance.
***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .10
tional effects are controlled for. Female and married
respondents are more likely to have remigration in-
tentions. With respect to remigration intentions, we
cannot confirm findings from earlier studies (see
above, footnote 3) that Turks with higher levels of
education are particularly prone to remigrate. The
fit of the model increases substantially if we take
migrants’ economic, social, and cultural ties in Ger-
many and Turkey and their transnational activities
into account.14 Interestingly, retired people are not
those who are most likely to plan remigration. At
this stage in life remigration illusions appear to
have largely either become reality or been aban-
doned. The other variables point in the expected di-
rection: The presence of relatives in the country
and children in the household tend to decrease re-
migration intentions while transnational activities
such as sending remittances increase them. The
models suggest that remigration intentions are not
only a matter of economic and social ties and re-
sources. Those who identify with and feel at home
in Turkey during visits plan to remigrate more
often. With respect to migrants’ identification with
Germany the opposite holds true. Nevertheless, the
negative effect of the SOEP year for the pre-2002
period remains stable and significant once mi-
grants’ identifications are taken into account. Obvi-
ously, settlement intentions increased in the period
under consideration independently of increasing
economic, social, and emotional ties to Germany.
The results of the robustness checks are displayed
in Table A4 (online appendix). Overall, they con-
firm the results presented here.15
So far, our findings are neither new nor surprising.
This changes when we turn to the models for the
period after 2001. As suggested by the descriptive
results presented above, these models show a signif-
icant and stable positive effect for year of measure-
ment. Apart from that, the models for both the
time periods under consideration look rather simi-
lar. An interesting difference between the pre- and
post-2001 models is that identification with Ger-
many – despite increasing over time – is no longer
negatively related to remigration. This contradicts
the idea that a withering identification with Ger-
many is triggering remigration plans. Rather, iden-
tification with Germany is no longer a barrier to
remigration. The finding that experiences of dis-
crimination are completely unrelated to migrants’
remigration intentions backs this interpretation.
Remitting is no longer positively related to remigra-
tion after 2001 but this change may reflect small
numbers of remitting individuals.
Overall, the stable and positive effect of the year of
measurement in the post-2001 models shows that
the post-2001 increase in remigration intentions
cannot be accounted for by the factors included in
our models. For example, the positive effect of the
year of measurement does not vanish once mi-
grants’ decreasing social ties to Germans (see varia-
ble “visits to and from Germans” until 2001 and
afterwards in Table 1) are controlled for. Since
SOEP data allows us to control for an encompass-
ing range of factors driving remigration intentions,
it seems quite possible that rising remigration inten-
tions are related to processes in the country of ori-
gin rather than to the situation of Turkish migrants
in Germany.
Models for second generation Turks born and
raised in Germany confirm our descriptive findings
that this group’s remigration intentions decreased
until 2001. However, our multivariate findings for
the period after 2001 demonstrate that these inten-
tions remain stable – and do not increase as they do
for first generation migrants. Apart from this im-
portant difference, the results are basically the
same as for first generation Turks. Ties in Germany,
notably the presence of relatives and identification
with Germany correspond with a low intention to
remigrate while the opposite is true for Turkish-lan-
guage skills and identification with Turkey. Again,
experiences of discrimination are unrelated to remi-
gration intentions, and this is the case with the mi-
grants’ level of education as well.
In order to analyze actual remigration behavior –
as well the link between remigration intentions and
actual remigration – we will now take a closer look
at the dynamics at work in Turkish migrants’ remi-
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14 The calculation of likelihood-ratio tests in nested mod-
els shows that with one exception (second generation mi-
grants after 2001), all models including a further set of in-
dependent variables have significantly more explanatory
power than the previous model (p < .05).
15 In the model restricted to those respondents who are in
the SOEP since 1984, some coefficients (year of measure-
ment, occupational status retired, family ties) lose their
significance – probably due to the smaller sample size –
without changing their direction. The comparison be-
tween discrete-time and fixed-effect models shows that,
with the exception of family ties, good Turkish language
skills, and remittances, the results presented above are
confirmed. For these variables, level rather than causal ef-
fects seem to be at work, i. e., those who speak Turkish
are more likely to have an intention to remigrate whereas
those whose Turkish skills increase do not show a rising
tendency to remigrate. The piecewise constant model and
the model excluding left truncated events reveal results
similar to those of the full model.
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Table 3 Remigration intentions of second generation immigrants: discrete time models, hazard ratios
Socio-demographic
characteristics
(Basic Model)
+ Ties and Resources in
Germany and Turkey
(NE/NELM/transnationalism)
+ Discrimination in/
estrangement from
Germany (structural change)
Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001
Year of measurement 0.90***
(0.01)
1.02
(0.03)
0.92***
(0.02)
1.01
(0.04)
0.92**
(0.02)
1.01
(0.04)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 1.06
(0.09)
1.27**
(0.11)
1.49*
(0.34)
1.14
(0.12)
1.49*
(0.35)
1.15
(0.13)
Age2 0.99
(0.00)
0.99*
(0.00)
0.99*
(0.00)
0.99
(0.00)
0.99*
(0.00)
0.99
(0.00)
Female 0.85
(0.13)
1.25
(0.20)
0.71*
(0.13)
1.06
(0.20)
0.71*
(0.12)
1.02
(0.20)
Married 1.51**
(0.28)
0.90
(0.19)
1.38
(0.30)
0.86
(0.23)
1.43*
(0.30)
0.86
(0.22)
More than basic education 1.42
(0.34)
0.77
(0.16)
1.17
(0.28)
0.89
(0.21)
1.08
(0.26)
0.90
(0.21)
Ties and Resources in Germany and Turkey
Occupational Status
(Ref.: other non-working)
– unemployed 0.85
(0.25)
1.22
(0.46)
0.87
(0.25)
1.21
(0.46)
– working 0.69*
(0.14)
1.02
(0.24)
0.67*
(0.13)
0.99
(0.24)
Children in household 0.93
(0.16)
1.22
(0.26)
0.88
(0.15)
1.17
(0.26)
Family ties (Ref.: all
relatives in Turkey)
– most relatives in Turkey 0.11***
(0.06)
2.17
(1.12)
0.08***
(0.03)
2.01
(1.08)
– most relatives in Germany 0.77
(0.27)
0.80
(0.40)
0.67
(0.24)
0.92
(0.47)
– all relatives in Germany 0.48**
(0.13)
0.53
(0.26)
0.41**
(0.11)
0.55
(0.27)
Visits from/visiting Germans 0.91
(0.20)
0.74
(0.16)
0.96
(0.21)
0.76
(0.16)
Good German language skills 0.78
(0.12)
1.10
(0.25)
0.83
(0.12)
1.17
(0.28)
Good Turkish language skills 1.17
(0.12)
1.47**
(0.24)
1.11
(0.11)
1.38*
(0.22)
Remittances 1.43
(0.91)
0.66
(0.30)
1.45
(0.91)
0.63
(0.29)
Visits to Turkey 1.03
(0.27)
1.21
(0.28)
0.97
(0.25)
1.19
(0.28)
Feels at home during visits in
Turkey
1.63*
(0.43)
1.65*
(0.44)
1.59*
(0.42)
1.57
(0.43)
Identifies with Turkey 1.68**
(0.27)
1.61**
(0.32)
1.68**
(0.28)
1.51**
(0.30)
Discrimination in/estrangement from Germany
Has been discriminated 1.22
(0.20)
0.93
(0.18)
Identifies with Germany 0.51**
(0.11)
0.56**
(0.13)
gration behavior. Again, we compare the two time
periods and calculate the same models that were
used for remigration intentions. Results are dis-
played graphically in Figure 3 (for full tables see Ta-
ble A5 in the online appendix, for descriptives see
Table 1).
Similarly to the findings regarding remigration in-
tentions, we can observe a negative and stable ef-
fect of year of measurement until 2001. With the
inclusion of controls for migrants’ ties and resour-
ces (most importantly Turkish language skills and
having a job in Germany), this effect becomes
much smaller and is no longer statistically signifi-
cant. This suggests that remigration decreased be-
tween the mid-1980s and the turn of the millen-
nium because migrants’ ties in Germany became
stronger.
After 2001, we find a positive effect for year of
measurement, which reveals that not only remigra-
tion intentions have increased over time but actual
remigration did as well. Our multivariate analysis
produces two remarkable findings: First, the coeffi-
cient for year of measurement does not merely re-
main stable once migrants’ resources and ties are
controlled for but actually becomes larger. Obvi-
ously, remigration would have increased more
strongly than it actually did if the integration of
Turkish migrants (through holding a job, having a
family, identifying with Germany) had not pro-
gressed over time. Second, the strong positive effect
of the year of measurement remains stable even if
we control for remigration intentions. As expected,
these have a strong positive effect on actual remi-
gration independent of the time period under con-
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Table 3 (Continue)
Socio-demographic
characteristics
(Basic Model)
+ Ties and Resources in
Germany and Turkey
(NE/NELM/transnationalism)
+ Discrimination in/
estrangement from
Germany (structural change)
Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001 Until 2001 After 2001
Number of persons’ years 1,886 1,575 1,348 1,232 1,348 1,226
Number of persons 395 343 258 261 258 261
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10
Notes: binomial logit models were applied, controlling for time in risk period, missing dummies, robust cluster (person id) option used, col-
linearity were checked. Controlling for reliable educational degree over the whole observation period (bilztev$$==0): More than basic ed-
ucation until 2001: 0.66 (0.35), after 2001: 0.95 (0.30). If we restrict our basic models to the number of persons of the two further models
the effects of age and age2 in the period after 2001 are less pronounced and lose their significance.
***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .10
Fig. 3 Remigration behavior (first generation): effect of year of measurement
sideration (overall 74 percent of the Turkish mi-
grants who remigrated stated an intention to
migrate in the year before remigration). Remigra-
tion has thus become more likely even for those
who have not already had remigration intentions.
Analyses presented in the full models (see Table A5)
reveal that the small though slightly increasing
group of Turkish immigrants returning to Turkey
does not have a clear profile in terms of educational
level and both identification with and perceptions
of Germany, even though Turkish language skills
and identification with Turkey do have a positive
effect on remigration.
Remigration intentions may be something quite dif-
ferent than actual behavior, and the findings are
mixed with respect to our expectation that remigra-
tion intentions reflect attitudinal and emotional
variables to a greater extent than remigration be-
havior. While identification with Turkey enhances
remigration rates and intentions, identification
with Germany tends to reduce remigration inten-
tions but not behavior. Feelings of discrimination
are unrelated to both variables.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed how the remigra-
tion intentions and actual remigration of Turkish
migrants have evolved over time. While several
SOEP-based studies of remigration have been pub-
lished since the 1990s, our study has a new focus.
We describe and analyze long-term rate changes be-
tween the mid-1980s and the present. Our findings
show that some empirical reality corresponds to the
current debate about Turks returning to Turkey in
increasing numbers but that the perception of this
phenomenon needs to be qualified in several impor-
tant respects.
First, while there was in fact an increase in remigra-
tion intentions and rates for first-generation mi-
grants after the turn of the millennium, we can see
that there has been no such increase in intentions
on the part of second generation migrants. In addi-
tion, very few German-born individuals with Turk-
ish-born parents actually return to Turkey. Second,
empirical evidence does not suggest that it is the
better educated who plan to leave the country. In a
similar vein, those who indicate an intention to re-
turn neither identify less strongly with Germany
nor do they feel discriminated against more fre-
quently than those who intend to stay.
In our analysis we drew upon a broad set of theo-
retical approaches to remigration. In that frame-
work, we have found that for first generation mi-
grants after 2001, rising rates of intended and
actual remigration have been unrelated to their in-
tegration into German society – a process that has
not shown any signs of disruption. In fact, without
the ongoing integration of Turkish migrants their
remigration rate would have been higher after
2001. This supports our argument that changes in
migrants’ ties and identifications with Germany or
in their host-country related resources have not
triggered the phenomena under consideration here
but that these are related to processes in the country
of origin. It is in fact those migrants who still iden-
tify as Turks and who still possess the necessary re-
sources, most importantly Turkish language skills,
who (plan to) re-settle in Turkey.
Of course, our analysis also has limitations. First of
all, the sample of migrants included in the SOEP
tends to be somewhat skewed. Recent immigration
cohorts are underrepresented in the SOEP and the
sample of migrants included in the survey panel
may be skewed towards the better integrated indi-
viduals since marginalized migrants might be more
difficult to re-interview. However, while our de-
scriptive analysis may be somewhat flawed by this
sample selectivity, our multivariate analysis shows
that the effect of year of observation after 2001 re-
mains stable even after controlling for composi-
tional change in the sample (for example with re-
spect to migrants’ duration of stay in Germany).
Secondly, emigration is coded in the SOEP and this
dataset is often used for studies on emigration but
even this coding has its limits and may not be to-
tally reliable: Some “re-migrants” may have moved
to another country than their country of origin;
similarly, some respondents who may have moved
back might not have been coded correctly as remi-
grants (Constant & Massey 2002). However, it
seems rather unlikely that this affects the two time
periods under consideration here – until 2001 and
after 2001 – in a different way, and a general under-
or overcount of remigration is unlikely to affect our
main findings. Thirdly, the sample of migrants in-
cluded in our analysis has become increasingly se-
lective over time with respect to their remigration
intentions. This however, leads to an under- rather
than overestimation of remigration intentions over
time because many migrants with intentions to
leave have already done so. This increasing selectiv-
ity, in fact, renders it even more astounding that re-
migration intentions have increased after 2001.
We applied several robustness-checks: We restricted
our analysis on remigration intentions to the sub-
sample of those migrants who are included in the
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SOEP since 1984 to check for changes in the sam-
ple composition; we estimated FE-logit models in
order to additionally settle issues of causality; we
calculated a piecewise constant model and a model
excluding left truncated events (see Table A4). We
also re-analyzed our models by using extra-reliable
information on education over the whole observa-
tion period and by using the same cases in all mod-
els. Our main findings remain stable across all
models.
7 Conclusions
Overall, we are thus quite confident that our main
finding is reliable. However, the most serious limi-
tation of our study is that with the data at hand we
cannot further qualify our assumption that pull-fac-
tors in Turkey are triggering rising emigration rates.
We do not know a great deal about the nature of
dynamics in Turkey that may render remigration
more appealing but we believe that the economic
opportunities of a prospering country play an im-
portant role in this respect. Even though joblessness
overall increased rather than decreased after the
turn of the last century (as did the share of individ-
uals with some sort of tertiary education among the
unemployed), it is quite possible that economic
change in specific economic niches such as tourism
have rendered remigration attractive for migrants
who are able to work as mediators between Ger-
man and Turkish culture. Furthermore, further re-
search needs to assess if Kirdar’s argument that
among middle-aged first generation migrants, a
higher purchasing power parity enhances their
proneness to return because it becomes more at-
tractive to spend their earnings back home (2009:
424), can explain long-term trends in Turkish mi-
grants emigration rates.
We also tested alternative ideas about macro-struc-
tural change in Turkey, namely that cultural rather
than economic change is responsible for rising re-
migration intentions. Further analyses not pre-
sented here support our assumption that these dy-
namics involve economic factors rather than
cultural change: Religious Turks – i. e., those who
frequently attend religious services – are not more
likely to return to Turkey than less religious Turks.
In other words, remigration is not particularly ap-
pealing to migrants who are very religious. The
same holds true for easy-at-hand alternative ex-
planations such as rising shares of Turks holding a
German passport who are able to travel back and
forth between Germany and Turkey as they like:
German citizenship is unrelated or – as an indicator
of integration in Germany – negatively related to
remigration intentions and behavior. And according
to SOEP data, the increase in remigration inten-
tions and behavior cannot be found for other immi-
grant groups but is typical for Turks. It does thus
not reflect a general increase in international mobi-
lity (see Gerhards & Hans 2013).
However, unless truly border-spanning data sets be-
come available, many assumptions about the fac-
tors triggering rising remigration intentions and
rates among Turkish immigrants remain specula-
tive. Only such data would allow us to follow up
emigrants after they have again become immigrants
– to the very country they once left.
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